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Abstract: The paper addresses a popular argument that accounts of assertion in 
terms of constitutive norms are incompatible with conventionalism about asser-
tion. The argument appeals to an alleged modal asymmetry: constitutive rules are 
essential to the acts they characterize, and therefore the obligations they impose 
necessarily apply to every instance; conventions are arbitrary, and thus can only 
contingently regulate the practices they establish. The paper argues that this line 
of reasoning fails to establish any modal asymmetry, by invoking the distinction 
between the non-discriminating existence across possible worlds of types (“blue-
prints”, as Rawls called them) of practices and institutions defined by constitutive 
rules, and the discriminating existence of those among them that are actually in 
force, and hence truly normative. The necessity of practices defined by constitu-
tive rules that the argument relies on concerns the former, while conventionalist 
claims are only about the latter. The paper should thus contribute to get a better 
understanding of what social constructs conceived as defined by  constitutive 
norms are. It concludes by suggesting considerations that are relevant to  deciding 
whether assertion is in fact conventional.
Keywords: Assertion; Convention; Constitutive norms; Normativity.
1   Assertion Conventionalism
Stalnaker (2014, p. 36–7) contrasts two different ways of thinking about speech acts. 
Austin (1962) advocates thinking of them as social practices constituted by social 
norms, established and maintained by conventions; this is entailed by his propos-
ing a framework for their characterization that assumes that “there must exist an 
accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect” (ibid., 14). 
Grice (1957) takes them instead to be definable in natural, psychological terms, 
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in terms of a peculiar kind of reflexive intention. As a result of Strawson’s (1964) 
forceful criticism of Austin’s (1962) social account of speech acts, and in spite of 
the important work of proponents of such accounts like Searle (1969) and Alston 
(2000), until recently the Gricean psychological account supported by Strawson 
has been the default in contemporary philosophy; Stalnaker’s own work is a good 
illustration. This situation has been changing in the past years, in part through 
the deserved impact of Williamson’s (1996/2000) account of assertion, which has 
brought back into the philosophical landscape normative accounts on which asser-
tion is defined by constitutive norms.
Austin and Dummett (1981, p. 298; 1993, p. 21–223) conjoined normativism 
and conventionalism in their views of assertion. On their view, speech acts are 
“social constructs” in a clear-cut sense of the notion, as elaborated below in §3. 
Williamson, however, is keen to dash any conventionalist hopes that his account 
might encourage, invoking for this purpose the modal disparity argument I will 
critically examine in the rest of the paper:
Constitutive rules are not conventions. If it is a convention that one must φ, then it is contin-
gent that one must φ; conventions are arbitrary, and can be replaced by alternative conven-
tions. In contrast, if it is a constitutive rule that one must φ, then it is necessary that one 
must φ … a rule will count as constitutive of an act only if it is essential to that act: neces-
sarily, the rule governs every performance of the act (op. cit., 239).
Here is a reconstruction of this argument, AMD (Argument of Modal Disparity):
1. Assertion is a kind defined by constitutive norms.
2. Constitutive norms impose their obligations in all possible worlds.
3. Conventions are arbitrary, hence contingent, hence practices instituted by 
them do not obligate in all worlds.
∴ The assertoric practice is not conventional, for it exists and imposes obligations in worlds 
in which no conventionally instituted norm imposes obligations.
There is an interpretation of the conclusion of Williamson’s argument – that 
 constitutive rules are not conventions, as he states it – on which nobody should 
reject it.1 Taken as abstract entities – blueprints for practices, as Rawls (1955, 
p. 26 fn.) aptly puts it – conventions (i.e. institutions or practices established 
by conventions) and constitutive norms (i.e. institutions or practices defined by 
1 As shown in section §3 below, Williamson (forthcoming) endorses this interpretation.
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constitutive norms) are different entities, different types or kinds.2 Nonetheless, 
Williamson’s argument is either misleading, or a straightforward non-sequitur. 
For constitutive norms thus understood are not really normative,3 while the 
assertion-conventionalism defended by the philosophers who had previously 
espoused the view that Williamson’s paper objects to, like Austin or Dummett, 
assumed that assertion is normative. AMD thus fails, because the conclusion, as 
just interpreted, is perfectly compatible with any sensible conventionalist claim 
that can be ascribed to such conventionalist philosophers.
This is thus what I will argue: the main consideration invoked in AMD – the 
modal difference between conventions and constitutive norms – is inapt to cast 
doubt on forms of conventionalism worth considering. When taken as addressed 
to reject a sensible conventionalism about assertion worth taking seriously, the 
second premise in AMD is false. In arguing for this, I will emphasize a distinction 
that is needed to properly understand these issues – to have a clear conception of 
kinds defined by constitutive rules like games and, perhaps, speech acts: the dis-
tinction between Rawlsian blueprints, mere putative normative kinds, and truly 
normative kinds, whose defining norms have been enforced. In this way, and 
beyond the refutation of the unfortunately influential modal argument, I hope 
to contribute to get a better understanding of what social constructs conceived as 
defined by constitutive norms are.
Let me articulate such a sensible form of C(onventionalism) about A(ssertion) 
that, although wrong also in my view, remains untouched by Williamson’s 
argument:
CA The practice of assertion exists (so that speakers are in fact bound by its constitutive 
norms) only because a convention instituting and preserving it is in place.
Here I am assuming the following characterization of what a convention is – 
a minimal common core to the accounts by Lewis (1975), Bach and Harnish 
2 Marmor (2009, p. 31–44) argues that some constitutive rules (for instance, those defining 
games) are conventions. Thus, he would dispute even Williamson’s explicitly stated conclusion, 
although he does not discuss the argument. As elaborated below, I find it more accurate to say 
that, while constitutive rules in themselves are not conventions, in some cases practices defined 
by them (such as games) are conventional, in that these practices are in force (established and 
maintained) in virtue of the enforcement of a convention. But this might just be merely termino-
logical; I think I agree with Marmor on most substantive issues in this debate.
3 This is something that, as shown in §3 below, Williamson currently grants but, as I’ll indicate, 
it is at the very least not acknowledged in the 1996 article.
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(1979, p. 120–134), Davis (2003, p. 204–219), Marmor (2009) and Geurts (2018): 
a  convention is a social regularity in the behavior of a group, which serves a 
common interest (it solves a “coordination problem”, on Lewis’s account) and is 
arbitrary in that there is an alternative which would have solved it just as well. 
I want to emphasize that I do not at all intend to argue for CA; on the contrary, I 
will end up suggesting that CA is not true, to that extent agreeing with William-
son. My claim will rather be that the debate about whether core illocutionary 
forces are conventional should address CA, putting aside the irrelevant modal 
considerations that Williamson’s argument deploys.
Searle (1995, p. 28) also contends that constitutive rules are not conventions, 
on the basis of considerations very similar to Williamson’s: “I am discussing 
rules and not conventions. It is a rule of chess that we win the game by check-
mating the king. It is a convention of chess that the king is larger than a pawn. 
 “Convention” implies arbitrariness, but constitutive rules in general are not in 
that sense  arbitrary”. Searle’s argument is not as developed as Williamson’s, 
because of that, I’ll only discuss the latter. What I say below will show however 
why, although the constitutive rules of chess are not themselves conventions, 
chess is  reasonably taken to be a conventional practice, in the very sense that 
philosophers like Austin or Dummett (wrongly, in this case, in my view) took 
assertion to be.4
Williamson’s anticonventionalist argument is influential in its apparent 
 simplicity, which justifies critically addressing it. Thus, referring to it Ball (2014a, 
p. 341) produces a straightforward version of AMD, arguing that assertion is not 
conventional on that basis: “constitutive norms govern the action types of which 
they are constitutive as a matter of necessity. So, constitutive norms are not con-
ventional”. Jankovic (2018, p. 376, fn. 11) also assumes the argument: “Consti-
tutive rules and conventions should be distinguished in general. It is a rule of 
chess that a pawn moves a certain way, and one is not playing chess if one is not 
acting in accord with this rule. It is a convention that thus-and-such a piece of 
wood serves as a pawn – it is arbitrary and we could use any object as a pawn 
as long as we agree on the same one”.5 The first goal of the paper is to show why 
4 In agreement with his take on these matters indicated in the previous footnote, Marmor 
(op. cit., 35) dismisses Searle’s claim as unsupported; as said, he does not discuss Williamson’s 
more elaborate considerations, but I assume he would reject it along similar lines.
5 Relying on Williamson’s argument Green and Williams (2007, p. 14) argue that the declarative 
mood cannot conventionally indicate assertion because “a convention is a practice that could 
have been otherwise, but it is not an optional feature of assertion that it is used for the manifes-
tation of belief”. What they argue against here is not the core conventionalist claim, but their 
appeal to AMD is equally objectionable and equally fails to establish what they want.
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the argument is a non sequitur. In so doing, I will highlight a central distinction 
needed to understand what normatively constituted kinds are, which appears to 
be easily overlooked in this debate. This gives an additional interest to the ensuing 
discussion. The paper should thus help to understand better a central debate in 
social ontology: what normatively constituted kinds are, and what it would take 
for them to be conventional; and thereby, as said, to get a better understanding of 
what social constructs defined by constitutive norms are.
I will take up these issues in §3. Before I need to briefly outline the debate on 
whether speech acts like assertion have a normative nature, or rather a psycho-
logical, “natural” one. That is independently needed to frame the discussion, but 
it will also help us to understand how the crucial distinction I make in §3 is so 
easily overlooked, in spite of being so obvious once it is pointed out. The reason 
is that the debate takes for granted that the kind at stake (assertion) is already in 
place, which invites disregarding the issue of how that has come to be.
2   Assertion: Natural or Normative?
In this section I present the notion of assertion that we will be discussing. As 
I’ll point out, the assumptions on assertion articulated here are shared with 
 Williamson. Debates on this issue assume that we have a pre-theoretical notion 
of assertion (or stating, claiming, affirming, which I take to be other common 
words for the same phenomenon) on which this is an act that we perform in 
central cases by uttering declarative sentences: “In natural language, the default 
use of declarative sentences is to make assertions”, Williamson (op. cit., 258). I 
take such central cases (Williamson’s “flat-out” assertions, ibid. 246) to be those 
in which we aim to be “taken at our word”, such as using literally a declarative 
sentence to answer a request for information, or to tell friends how our day went. 
I’ll assume further that the distinction that the Kripke-Putnam arguments about 
natural kinds have made salient, between nominal essence and real nature, 
applies also in this case.6 Here are three features of the nominal essence of the 
6 In this discussion, I don’t use “natural” in opposition to “social”, but rather to refer to prop-
erties and kinds in Lewis’ (1983) “sparse” (as opposed to “abundant”) sense. The account I’ll 
suggest in §3 for assertion takes it to be a “social construct”, definable by social rules.  “Natural” 
properties and kinds are those that play substantive explanatory roles, and hence have a  “hidden 
nature” which only reveals itself after theorizing. This might just be philosophical,  armchair-like; 
but it should be unifiable with empirical theorizing along standard lines.
Brought to you by | Universitat de Barcelona
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/13/19 8:16 PM
6      Manuel García-Carpintero
kind I aim to pick out: (i) It is a kind of intentional act, whose point is to produce 
outright belief. (ii) In performing it, speakers present themselves as believing 
what they say. (iii) It has a “word-to-world” direction of fit – when its content 
does not fit the world, there is a mistake in the act, unlike in the case of the 
central acts we make with interrogatives and imperatives.
These features of the nominal essence of assertion, which help us picking 
out central cases, manifest themselves in our normative practices: in our finding 
appropriate to criticize, or required to excuse, assertions when what is said is 
false, when the speaker does not believe it, or the audience already has the belief. 
Conversely, there are uses of declarative sentences that fail to be central because 
they clearly lack some of these features. Thus, e.g. cases in which the sentences 
occur in a fiction, or in which the speaker adds an appositive “I guess”, “I think”, 
“I assume”, “I conjecture”, or “I promise”; cases in which the sentence occurs 
embedded as the antecedent of a conditional, a disjunct, or as a prejacent in a 
modal sentence; explicit performatives such as “I hereby promise that …”; or, 
indeed, cases in which the speaker manifestly does not aim to be believed merely 
because she is saying so, like many of the claims literally made by means of 
declarative sentences in this paper.
As indicated, this is only intended to elucidate the intuitive features of a 
pre-theoretically familiar kind. It is part of the idea that the kind in question 
is natural in that it is presumed to have an essence or nature “hidden” in not 
being  immediately accessible to intuition, and available only, if at all, after 
theoretical scrutiny. The Gricean and Williamsonian proposals to be summed 
up presently are attempts at theoretically specifying it;7 such research might 
well conclude that there is after all no kind shared by central cases, but merely 
a disunified motley (Cappelen 2011). If, however, the assumption is confirmed, 
it might turn out that, given the true nature of assertion, we also make it in 
non-central cases.
As pointed out, conventionalism about illocutionary forces usually comes 
together with the nonetheless conceptually independent claim that such forces 
have a normative character. This, in its turn, is sometimes motivated by the 
observation we have just made for the case of assertion, that we evaluate illocu-
tions relative to different norms; for instance, in the case of assertions relative to 
whether they are justified or otherwise, true or informative. As Hindriks (2007) 
notices, however, we also evaluate assertions relative to (invoking Rawls’s (1955) 
well-known distinction, influentially picked up by Searle (1969, p. 33–34)) merely 
regulative norms, norms that regulate, relative to certain purposes, acts that in 
7 So are the accounts by Brandom (1983), Dummett (1983, ch. 10) or Stalnaker (1978).
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themselves are constitutively non-normative – for instance, as witty, polite or 
well-phrased, in the case of speech acts.
Some writers question the distinction between constitutive and regulative 
rules; see Hindriks (2009) for discussion.8 But there cannot be anything conceptu-
ally problematic about the distinction itself, at least on the Aristotelian essential-
ist assumption I am making that the kinds of practices we are talking about have 
constitutive natures. One of the many merits of Williamson’s proposal, which 
partly explains its deserved influence, lies in the way it clear-headedly combines 
the view that practices like assertions have a nature specifiable by a definition, 
with the straightforwardly normative character of that nature.
Unlike what Searle (1969, p. 36, 41) has led some to think, the distinction does 
not have to do with the logical form of norms: whether they are genuine impera-
tive, or rather have a “A counts as B in C” shape.9 All norms, regulative or consti-
tutive alike, are semantically directives – although for the sake of convenience I 
will state them in declarative form, using modals such as “should” or “must”. All 
norms here relevant, regulative or constitutive, have contents that obtain under 
some conditions and fail to obtain under others. The difference between regula-
tive and constitutive norms lies just in that only the latter specify the constitutive 
nature of a practice: A norm N is constitutive of a practice π iff N specifies the 
constitutive nature of π, along the lines that Williamson’s KR below – or any of 
the alternatives – is supposed to define the identity of the kind assertion, whose 
nominal essence we characterized above. N is instead merely regulative for π if π 
has an independent constitutive nature – for instance, one specified in psycho-
logical terms by the Gricean account GA below, in the case of assertion.10
Let us now compare a paradigm Gricean account of the speech act we have 
independently identified – the influential one to be found in Bach and Harnish 
(1979, p. 42) – with Williamson’s account. “R-intending” here is to be explicated 
in terms of Gricean communicative intentions:
(GA) To assert p is to make an utterance thereby R-intending the hearer to take it as a 
reason to think that the speaker believes p and intends the hearer to believe it.
8 Guala and Hindriks (2015) develop Hindriks’ view, which I take to be close to the one I am 
advancing here. They argue for an ecumenical view, reconciling normative views on which in-
stitutions are rules, with naturalist views on which they are equilibria – behavioral patterns or 
regularities. On the view I will be putting forward, unlike mere blueprints, truly normative kinds 
(those that provide reasons to act) are defined by constitutive rules, and they are in force through 
equilibria or social norms. See Fricker (2017) for a similar view, and Graham (2019).
9 This point has been made frequently in the literature; cf. Ransdell (1971, p. 390–392); Lewis 
(1979, p. 344); Glüer and Pagin (1999, p. 217, 220).
10 Ball (2014a) makes a similar distinction between natural and normative kinds.
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Bach & Harnish’s GA is a descriptive account, not a normative one: unlike  normative 
accounts like those presented below, by itself it does not mention norms, but only 
certain psychological states of speakers and their intended audiences.11 As  Hindriks 
(2007) notes, although it is indeed a feature of our assertoric practices that we 
 criticize performances that violate rules like those mentioned in the  normative 
accounts below – for instance those that are false – these facts about our prac-
tices of appraising assertions are insufficient to justify normative accounts. For 
we also evaluate assertions – say, as witty, polite or well-phrased – relative to 
merely  regulative norms, norms that regulate, relative to certain purposes, acts 
in  themselves not constituted by such rules. All norms we apply to assertion are 
merely regulative of a constitutively non-normative practice defined by GA. The 
regulative norms in question could be derived from an ultimately moral sincerity 
rule such as SR:12
(SR) In situations of normal trust, one ought to be sincere.
Thus, for instance, the appraisal of assertions relative to a truth rule could be 
explained as merely regulative, on the assumption that GA characterizes their 
nature, as derived from SR given the further assumption that the speaker’s belief 
that his assertion is supposed to give the audience reasons to ascribe to him is 
itself regulated by a truth rule.
In contrast with descriptive accounts such as GA, Williamson claims that 
the following norm or rule (the knowledge rule) is constitutive of assertion, and 
 individuates it:
(KR) One must ((assert p) only if one knows p).
In the course of the debate that this proposal has generated, other writers have 
accepted the view that assertion is defined by constitutive rules, but have pro-
posed alternative norms; thus, Weiner (2005) proposes a truth rule, (TR), Lackey 
(2007) a reasonableness rule, (RBR), and I and others – García-Carpintero (2004, 
forthcoming), Hinchman (2013), Pelling (2013) a knowledge provision rule, (KPR):
(TR) One must ((assert p) only if p).
11 In agreement with the descriptivist ambitions of the program, I take “reason” in GA not to 
be understood in normative terms; a reason is here a piece of evidence, perhaps a premise in a 
possible inference. Bach and Harnish (1979, p. 15–16) are not explicit about this, cf. Bach (2008).
12 Lewis (1969, p. 98) also suggests that norms applying to conventionally instituted kinds can 
be derivative from moral norms. I am not endorsing Hindriks’ argument, but merely using it to 
introduce the debate about conventions and constitutive norms. Cf. the exchange between Ball 
(2014b,c) and Hindriks and Kooi (2014), and also Kelp (2018).
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(RBR) One must ((assert p) only if it is reasonable for one to believe p).
(KPR) One must ((assert p) only if one’s audience gets thereby to be in a position to know p).
The obligations these rules impose are sui generis, like those constitutive of 
games, the model on which Williamson bases his account: they do not have 
their source in norms of morality, rationality, prudence or etiquette. They are not 
all things considered, but pro tanto; in any particular case, they can be overruled 
by stronger obligations imposed by other norms. They are intended to character-
ize what is essential or constitutive of assertion (and not, as it may seem at first 
glance, of correct assertion). The view is that assertion is an act essentially consti-
tuted by its being beholden to the relevant norm. On Williamson’s view, assertion 
is the unique representational act such that, in performing it, one is committed 
to knowing the represented proposition; i.e. the propositional act such that, if 
one performs it without knowing the intended proposition, one is thereby con-
travening its constitutive obligation. There are additional rules contributing to 
a full characterization of assertion, as in Searle’s (1969) well-known account or 
in Alston’s (2000) elaboration, i.e. “sincerity” or “preparatory” conditions. The 
rules are intended to characterize what an act must “count as” for it to be an 
assertion, i.e. what Searle describes as its “essential rule”.
As indicated, it is common ground among participants in these debates that 
assertion is the actually existing practice for which we gave an independent char-
acterization above: what is done by default (i.e. unless the utterance is ironic, 
fictive, includes canceling parenthetical remarks such as “I conjecture”, etc.) by 
uttering declarative sentences. This gives us an independent specification of the 
phenomenon that we aim to characterize, and hence gives us a grip that allows us 
to evaluate them: it is the act, whatever its proper definition is, that is in fact asso-
ciated with the indicative mood in natural languages as used on central cases, and 
which speakers intentionally purport to make by such means on such occasions.
The crucial difference between normative accounts along the lines of those 
just outlined and descriptive accounts such as GA lies in the question of whether 
all norms we invoke to appraise assertions are merely regulative (as on the latter 
view), or some of them (the truth rule, some knowledge rule, some reasonable-
ness rule) are instead essential or constitutive. Williamson presents his proposal 
as a hypothesis for which he gives abductive support. We do not need to go into 
the reasons he has offered for this. What we will use from this section for our 
discussion in the next is the point that assertion is an already existing practice 
whose instances we can independently specify in core cases, which is assumed to 
have a nature worth theorizing about, and which, on worth considering propos-
als, is in fact a specific normative kind.
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3   The Alleged Modal Disparity between 
Convention and Assertion
Now, as suggested above, one might have thought that a normative view of 
speech acts along the lines of Williamson’s for asserting could provide some 
support for a conventionalist claim like CA. Of course, Gricean conceptions of 
forces, such as GA for assertion, reject such conventionalist claims, following 
Strawson’s (1964) influential criticism of Austin.13 On these views, assertion is a 
non-arbitrary natural phenomenon, not at all dependent on convention for its 
institution and preservation. Williamson, however, argues as we have seen that 
in fact an account of assertion in terms of constitutive rules makes it impossi-
ble for assertion to be conventional in any significant sense.14 Readers knowing 
the philosophical context in which the paper was produced would assume that 
his argument is addressed at conventionalist views of assertion like Austin’s or 
Dummett’s – philosophers who had conjoined before normative views of asser-
tion with conventionalist claims about it. I will now show why the argument is 
fallacious.
As we saw in §1, Williamson’s argument AMD invokes a modal disparity 
between acts that are essentially defined by a constitutive norm, and conven-
tions. Conventions are arbitrary; they have alternatives, and hence may not have 
existed, even in the presence of the needs motivating their implementation. The 
obligations they impose are thereby equally contingent: “if it is a convention that 
one must φ, then it is contingent that one must φ” (op. cit., 239). Obligations deriv-
ing from constitutive rules, in contrast, are necessary: “if it is a constitutive rule 
that one must φ, then it is necessary that one must φ” (ibid).
13 Note however that Strawson’s claims are much more nuanced than the argument by 
 Williamson we will be presently discussing. Strawson points out that many speech acts (all 
 declarations, but also core ones like commands) are indeed conventional (Strawson 1964, p. 457), 
and he is sensitive to the considerations that might drive one to argue that assertions are after 
all conventional too (ibid., 459–60), not just in the trivial sense mentioned in the next footnote.
14 Assertion is trivially conventional in that it can be made or expressed by conventional means 
(Geurts 2018, p. 126); Williamson (1996, p. 267–268) grants that assertion is conventional in this 
sense. But, as Strawson (1964, p. 442) points out against some suggestions by Austin that this 
is all he means by his prima facie controversial conventionality claim, in this sense everything 
is conventional. There is a serious philosophical debate about whether logical or mathematical 
necessities are conventional; but if “conventional” is meant in this sense, there would be nothing 
to debate: they are certainly conventional in that sense, for of course they can be expressed by 
conventional means. Hence, this is not the sense of being conventional here at stake.
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This argument should be immediately suspicious. Consider the illocution-
ary forces that Searle (1969) classifies as declarations, such as redoubling at 
bridge, calling out a player at baseball or marrying a couple. Intuitively, such 
forces are conventional;15 philosophers with little sympathy for conventional-
ism about assertion agree on this (cf. Strawson 1964, p. 456–457). However, if 
acts like assertions are practices defined by constitutive norms, declarations are 
likely also similarly defined, and hence, Williamson’s modal disparity argument 
would establish that they cannot be conventional either. The point also applies 
to games, the very model on which Williamson bases his account: while they are 
defined by constitutive norms, intuitively they are as conventional as the clear-
est paradigms of conventional activities, such as using particular expressions to 
convey particular meanings or driving on the right.
To see where the fallacy in AMD lies, we will reflect on a point that Williamson 
notices. He admits that his account of constitutive rules involves some idealiza-
tion, which can be seen by considering the case of real games. Let us take the case 
of soccer, association football. Throughout its history, there have been changes 
in the constitutive rules that define that game, without intuitively a change in its 
identity. How does this fit with the account in terms of constitutive rules? William-
son appeals here to Lewis (1975) related discussion of languages and language: 
one and the same historically continuous language in use might be properly char-
acterized at different stages by different “grammars” or  theoretically articulated 
abstract languages: “a population that at one time has the convention of speak-
ing a language L may later change to a convention of speaking a distinct language 
L*, constituted by slightly different rules. Likewise, in the present  technical sense 
of “speech act”, the rules of a speech act are essential to it. A population that at 
one time has the convention of using a certain device to perform a speech act A 
may later change to a convention of using that device to perform a distinct speech 
act A*, governed by slightly different rules. “Game” can receive a similar sense” 
(op. cit., 239).
So, in the intended “technical sense”, the speech acts defined by norms such 
as KR, TR, RBR and KPR are like Lewis’s abstract languages, and we should dis-
tinguish them from the actual speech acts that people perform, which are rather 
like Lewis’s languages in use; for the latter can be characterized by different 
instances of the former at different stages in their history. There is perhaps actu-
ally used English, which at some time in a history originating from a language 
brought to England by Germanic settlers in the fifth to seventh centuries might 
be properly characterized by abstract language AE1 – and hence had as a proper 
15 Not just in the sense considered in the previous footnote, but one along the lines of CA above.
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temporal part actually used AE1 – and at a different stage by AE2 – and hence had 
as another proper temporal part actually used AE2.16 Similarly, there is actually 
played association football, with a history going back to games played at public 
schools in England in the 18th century and earlier, and characterized by different 
set of rules as played at different times and places, first partially codified in the 
mid-nineteenth century.17 Likewise, there is actually occurring assertion, which 
in the quotation above Williamson suggests we understand as we have neutrally 
characterized it in §2, as the act done by default when uttering declarative sen-
tences. This act might have had a history such that, say, TR initially defined it, 
and now Williamson is right that it is rather KR that defines it.
Note also that abstract languages might fail to characterize any actually 
used language. Two linguists might dispute whether it is AE1, or rather AE2, that 
properly characterizes English at a certain point; perhaps both are wrong, and 
neither set of rules properly does the job. As Schiffer (1993) notes, it would be 
inapt to say in such a case that neither AE1 nor AE2 “exist”, because being abstract 
entities they exist in all worlds.18 We will say instead that they are not used or 
in force. The same could apply, mutatis mutandis, to the acts “in the technical 
sense” whose constitutive rules TR, RBR, KR and KPR specify. To be perspicu-
ous, let us use “assertion” to refer to the naturally existing act made by default 
by uttering declarative sentences, and “assertion-tr”, “assertion-kr”, and so on, 
to the abstract acts that those rules specify – what Rawls (1955, p. 26 fn.) takes to 
be mere blueprints for practices. The debate thus concerns whether assertion is 
characterized by one such rule (as opposed to being a merely psychological type 
of entity, say, one defined by GA), and, if so, by which, assertion-kr, assertion-tr, 
etc; or perhaps, as pluralists such as Levin (2008) or Goldberg (2015) suggest, in 
fact several rules define it in different contexts. Some of those blueprints may 
thus not be in force at all in the actual world.
Williamson is thus aware of the distinction between abstract normative types, 
and normative types that are in force, and in fact chooses to talk about the former. 
In more recent work, he is more forthcoming and explicit about this: “I will follow 
the usual practice of sometimes using the word ‘norm’ for  candidate norms, 
16 There also of course is some abstract entity corresponding to English throughout its history. 
Alternatively, we can take “Actually Used English” to be a temporally non-rigid designator, pick-
ing out different abstract objects at different times.
17 There of course also are games specified by each of these set of rules actually played for short-
er periods, constituting the history of the temporally extended game association football. See the 
previous footnote.
18 Given the Platonist assumptions that I make, assuming them to be a mere convenience. On a 
nominalist view, none of them exist at all: “they” are just convenient fictions.
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 putative norms that may or may not be genuine norms (may or may not yield 
some sort of genuine ‘ought’ or ‘should’), when no confusion is likely to arise” 
(Williamson, forthcoming). We can now see that Williamson’s claim, “if it is a 
constitutive rule that one must φ, then it is necessary that one must φ” is just trivi-
ally true. For this is a claim about speech acts in his “technical sense”, i.e. about 
speech acts as merely blueprints, or as merely putative norm-defined kinds, such 
as assertion-kr, defined by constitutive rules perhaps nowhere in force, giving 
nobody reasons to act, entailing no genuine “ought”s or “should”s.19 To be sure, 
these abstract entities are not conventional; but nobody properly understanding 
the issues would ever deny this, certainly not philosophers holding conventional-
ist views about assertion such as Austin or Dummett. They where making claims 
about a kind, assertion, which they take to be really normative, really giving 
assertors and their audiences reasons to act – not about mere “candidate” or 
“putative” norms, mere blueprints for normative kinds.
To illustrate, let us consider a traditional game before anybody tried to codify 
its constitutive rules, such as what was later called association football as it was 
played in a given public school in England in 1800. Let us imagine two differ-
ent plausible candidates to fully and properly characterize their constitutive 
rules, 1800F1 and 1800F2. Imagine also that the first is correct but not the second. 
They both describe abstract games by their constitutive rules, so, as Williamson 
notes, to the extent that one plays either of them, necessarily one is obligated 
by its rules. But note firstly that this is a rather Pickwickian sense of obligation; 
for it applies both to the rules codified by 1800F1, but also to those codified by 
1800F2 – a game that we might assume nobody has ever played, so that no actual 
person has ever been beholden to its norms. Secondly and more important, it 
is a matter of convention, and hence arbitrary, that people playing association 
football at that time and place were under the obligations codified by 1800F1. For 
these people could have instead agreed to be under the obligations imposed by 
1800F2: presumably this would have served equally well the motivations they had 
to engage in that activity.20 Hence, although the game is defined by constitutive 
rules, which  necessarily oblige in the Pickwickian sense, it was conventional in 
this clear-cut sense: it was a matter of convention that a game defined by those 
rules, 1800F1, was in force, as opposed to one defined by 1800F2.
19 See Broome (2014, ch. 2) for a sharp discussion of the “core” normative meaning of ought that 
I am assuming here, distinguishing it from other senses.
20 Motivations such as to execute a “voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles” 
(Suits 1978, p. 55), so that this creates “opportunities for developing certain human excellences 
by presenting obstacles that must be mastered and overcome in order to achieve the goal set by 
the game”, Russell (2004, p. 146).
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This shows that, although the trivial points that abstract putative norms are 
not conventions, and do not come to be by convention, are true, entities  essentially 
constituted by norms might be conventional – as should also intuitively be the 
case. For the former are claims about blueprints, while the latter is one about 
normative kinds that are in force – about what it is that makes them be in force. 
Hence, as an argument against the conventionality of assertion AMD is at best a 
non sequitur, betraying a misunderstanding of conventionalist claims. If taken 
as addressed to serious conventionalist claims such as CA, AMD fails because its 
second premise is false: for a constitutive norm to really impose any obligation, it 
must be in force; and its being in force might well be the result of a convention. If 
that is the case (as in the case of games), the practice, albeit defined by constitu-
tive norms, will fail to impose its obligations in all worlds.
4   Concluding Remarks
For my purposes, there is no point in speculating about the actual intentions of 
philosophers deploying AMD.21 The point I have been stressing is this. There are 
serious conventionalist claims that have been made in philosophy, in particular 
about assertion by philosophers like Austin and Dummett not long before AMD 
was formulated. It is natural to take it that a perspicuous and compelling norma-
tive view of assertion, like the one Williamson (1996) puts forward, offers a good 
background to promote them. And it is natural by the same token to take the argu-
ment one finds there, AMD, to be aimed to crush such hopes.22 As I showed at the 
outset, there is good evidence that many people take it that way. But in fact AMD 
does not thwart them, because conventionalist philosophers were not claiming 
21 Williamson (forthcoming) grants in the quotation above that “candidate” norms (mere blue-
prints) are not really normative. This acknowledgement is absent from the assertion paper, in 
which constitutive norms “in the technical sense” are unrestrictedly described as imposing obli-
gations. It is also significant that mere blueprints that are never in force are not considered; the 
distinction between actual speech acts and speech acts “in the technical sense” is only made 
relative to actually existing practices that enforce different putative norms at different times.
22 There is a debate in aesthetics on the interpretation of literary works; Irvin (2006) offers a 
good introduction. Actual intentionalists claim that it depends on the intentions of the author; 
moderates accept only as relevant those intentions that can be somehow discerned from the text. 
Hypothetical intentionalists, in contrast, contend that literary content is only dependent on the 
intentions that can be ascribed to a fictional author, given the text, its context, and the relevant 
literary practices. I am putting aside interpretative claims that require evidence congenial to ac-
tual intentionalism; my worries concern interpretations upheld by the hypothetical view.
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that merely putative norms are conventional – an obviously wrongheaded view. 
They were rather claiming that the actual practice of assertion we in fact have 
imposes its constitutive obligations on assertors exactly on the same grounds that 
the practice of soccer we in fact have imposes its own on players – to wit, by con-
vention. AMD does not address that claim.23
Unlike games and declarations, like Strawson (1964) I do not believe it is sen-
sible to think that fundamental speech acts like assertions, requests or promises 
are conventional, even though I take all those types to be defined by constitutive 
norms. I thus ultimately agree with Williamson. But the true reason has nothing 
to do with modal disparities, although non-arbitrariness has something to do 
with it. To properly investigate this issue, we should ask ourselves why it is that 
the norms of assertion are in force, assuming that some of them define asser-
tion. It is difficult to believe that assertion is conventional: the being in force of 
a norm whose point is ultimately to allow for testimonial knowledge is hardly 
arbitrary, hardly something for which there are alternatives that might have 
served the purpose equally well. The explanation seems more to do with teleol-
ogy and social norms, than with convention.24 I thus think that, unlike games and 
 declarations, fundamental speech acts like assertion, promising or requesting are 
not  conventional, but I cannot elaborate on my reasons here.
In this paper, I have offered a reply to a popular modal disparity argument 
against assertion-conventionalism, made by Searle, Williamson and many others. 
I have highlighted the relevance of Rawls’ distinction between mere blueprints for 
practices, candidate norms, and norms to which people are truly beholden. The 
view that practices like assertion or promising are defined by constitutive norms 
is controversial, but it has many sympathizers since Rawls formulated it. Here I 
have emphasized that, on that view, such practices should be understood as social 
23 There is a related modal argument against truth-conventionalism that also makes an unfair 
assumption – that the primary truth-bearers, propositions, are abstract entities. In previous 
work (García-Carpintero and Pérez Otero 2009) I have given a similar reply: serious proponents 
of such views were assuming a different view of truth-bearers, analogous to those that have be-
come more popular recently, on which they existentially depend on representational activities 
(or the language module). Thus understood, philosophically interesting truth-conventionalism 
(about logic or mathematics) still fails in my view, but the modal argument doesn’t establish it.
24 See Graham (2019), and references there. This raises interesting issues, to be pursued in other 
work. Could a practice be both regulated by constitutive and social or teleological norms?  Fricker 
(2017) has an interesting discussion. Should not the social or teleological norms suffice on their 
own to account for the normative features of assertion? Why do we need to posit constitutive 
norms in addition? (Cf. Kelp 2018) My reply would elaborate on Rawls’ (1955) about promises: 
there are  situations in which the social, moral and teleological motivations for not asserting what 
violates assertoric norms are absent, and, nonetheless, doing so would be intuitively wrong.
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constructs, put in force by social activities, whether or not such  activities are just 
conventions. When they are thus understood, the modal  disparity  considerations 
leave entirely open that they are. I have ended up  suggesting however that in 
fact it is not plausible to take them to be conventional, in a sense philosophically 
significant for this debate.
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